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NEW DIRECTIONS IN BANKCARD
COMPETITION
Jules Bernard*

Ever since 1971, when the Worthen Bank & Trust Company challenged
the membership rules of National BankAmericard, Inc.,' people have been
studying the competitive nature of bankcard2 services and debating how
these services should be treated under the antitrust laws. The debate has
recently focused on bankcard services that use electronic funds transfer
(EFT) technology. All sides agree that these new bankcard services can
help make the financial industry more efficient, more innovative, and more
responsive to the needs of consumers. The sides disagree, however, on the
role of these services in the nation's economy and on the proper way to
introduce them into the retail banking market.
The Department of Justice has suggested four ways to make the bankcard industry more competitive:
-Forbid all banks in any market to join in a single bankcard
system, even one that agrees to accept all banks that apply for
admission;
-Bar the Federal Reserve from using its automated clearing
house (ACH) facilities as the central switch for a bankcard system;
-Liberate bankcard terminals from the constraints that are applied to full-scale branches; and
* Attorney, Research Division, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, B.A., Yale,
1966; M.A., University of California, 1968; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1971.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
1. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 1309
(E.D. Ark. 1972), rev'd, 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).

2. In general, I will use the term "bankcard" to mean any kind of card that gives a
consumer access to an account (either depository or credit-line) at a depository institution.
Furthermore, I will call all depository institutions "banks" unless the context requires more
precision. For the purposes of these remarks, there is little reason to distinguish among
commercial banks, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions;
and the term "depository institution" is just too unwieldy. Further, with the adoption of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DIDMCA], thrifts seem to be well on their way
to full EFT powers.
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-Preempt state compulsory-sharing laws, under which banks
that operate bankcard facilities must allow any other banks to use
them on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.3
The National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers (NCEFT) has
espoused a procompetitive policy for bankcard systems and has generally
endorsed the Justice Department's proposals on these points.4
These proposals are rooted in the notion that bankcard systems are
highly integrated entities. From this perspective, each part of a system the cards, the terminals, the transmission lines, the switch, and even the
banks' own computer operations - must be designed to fit with every
other part, and every part must take its form from all the others. Banks
have to work together very closely when they develop integrated systems
of this kind. There is little room for any individual participating bank to
go its own way, either in offering unique services or in charging lower
prices, and there is almost no room at all for independent innovation. Accordingly, the focus of antitrust attention falls on the entire bankcard system as the basic competitive unit. Groups of banks are expected to
compete against one another in developing special capabilities, extra cost
advantages, and improved technology. This "systems level" competition is
supposed to produce a flexible and responsive bankcard industry in which
several regional systems do battle against one another in local markets.
This view of the bankcard industry may be on its way to oblivion. For
one thing, the structure of the bankcard industry has changed a great deal,
largely in response to one of the Justice Department's earliest - and least
representative - public statements.' Where once the two major bankcard
organizations maintained their distance from one another, today they
share a common pool of members. The differences between the organizations are more those of services provided than of constituency. For another, the technology of bankcard systems has advanced. Third-party
companies that specialize in the techniques of data communications now
3. The Department's suggestions appear in the comments it filed in the following
materials: Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal Reserve Banks, 41 Fed. Reg.
3097 (1976); Proposed Policy on Access to Federal Reserve Clearing & Settlement Facilities,
40 Fed. Reg. 25641 (1975); Proposed Transfer of Funds (transfers of funds through federal
reserve banks), 38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973); Letter from Assistant Attorney General Donald I.
Baker to William B. Brandt (March 7, 1977) (on file at Department of Justice) [hereinafter
cited as NETS Letter]; Letter from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Donald Baker to
Charles Allen, General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 24, 1975) (on file at
Department of Justice); Testimony of the Department of Justice, submitted to the Subcomm.
on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
concerning S. 2293 (May 19, 1978).
4. See notes 50-53 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 31-39 and accompanying text infra.
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stand ready to provide interchange services to banks on a pay-as-you-go
basis. Accordingly, the banks no longer have to create their own infrastructure for producing bankcard services, and they no longer have to
work so closely with one another in designing and planning their systems.
So long as they adhere to certain standards, they can be confident of having access to a multibank network.
In light of these changes, the Justice Department's four proposals have
lost much of their force and may no longer deserve much attention. Moreover, EFT services are continuing to evolve. They are beginning to merge
into, and become part of, more general data communications services services that are provided by companies outside the financial sector and
used by banks and nonfinancial companies alike. This trend raises new
and difficult questions about the proper limits of the "business of banking"
and about the proper ways to regulate it.
I.

NATIONAL BANKAMERICARD AND THE ANTIDUALITY RULE

The antitrust issues in the bankcard industry first became apparent in
the fall of 1970. At that time, the two national bank credit card organizations - National BankAmericard, Inc. (NBI) and Interbank - were
struggling for dominance. Historically the two systems had remained separate from one another, each organization viewing the other as a rival.
Both NBI and Interbank had two kinds of members: card-issuing banks
and "agent banks" that did not issue cards themselves, but merely
processed the credit slips engendered by credit card transactions. In most
communities, NBI licensed only one bank to issue BankAmericards, although it had no formal policy of doing so, and in some major cities gave
licenses to several banks. Interbank, by contrast, opened its doors to all
would-be card issuers. No bank, however, issued both cards. On the other
hand, both NBI and Interbank authorized many banks to process credit
slips as agent banks. A large number (including some card issuers) belonged to both systems for that purpose.
Worthen Bank and Trust Co., the dominant bank in Little Rock, Arkansas, belonged to NBI and issued BankAmericards. Worthen saw that it
could gain a competitive edge by issuing both cards to its customers.
Worthen submitted its application to Interbank in November of 1970, and
in April of the following year Interbank granted it. Worthen began to
make preparations to issue Master Charge cards.
NBI strongly disapproved of Worthen's initiative. In September of
1971, it adopted By-law 2.16, known as the "antiduality" rule, to
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strengthen the barriers between the two credit card organizations. 6 By-law
6. By-law 2.16 read as follows:
Section 2.16. Requirements with Respect to other Credit Cards.
(a) No Class A member shall directly or indirectly (i) own, (ii) issue, (iii) assist
in the issuance of, (iv) service, (v) honor, or (vi) enter into contractual relationships
with persons for the issuance of, or with merchants to honor, any Credit Cards
except (1) as permitted pursuant to sections 2.04 and 2.05, (2) Area Credit Cards,
and (3) Credit Cards owned or issued by any organization licensed to conduct the
BankAmericard program in a foreign country.
(b) No Class A member shall directly or indirectly accept for deposit or
purchase any instruments arising from the use of any Credit Cards except those
arising from (i) Credit Cards issued pursuant to sections 2.04 and 2.05, (ii) Area
Credit Cards, and (iii) Credit Cards owned or issued by any organization licensed
to conduct the BankAmericard program in a foreign country.
(c) No Class B member shall directly or indirectly (i) enter into contractual relationships with persons for the issuance of Credit Cards, except as may be permitted
by section 2.05 or (ii) own or issue in its own name Credit Cards, or (iii) appear on
Credit Cards or elsewhere as the owner or issuer thereof, except Area Credit Cards.
(d) If a parent, subsidiary or affiliate of a member takes any action which the
member may not take under the provisions of this section, such member shall be
deemed thereby to have violated this section unless, in the case of affiliates, (i)
there are no common officers or employees engaged in the management or operation of both BankAmericard and other Credit Card programs and (ii) the operations - including, without limitation, marketing, authorization, credit, collection
and solicitation - of such programs are separate; provided that paragraph (c) shall
not apply to parents, subsidiaries and affiliates which are Class A members. The
provisions of section 2.15 shall apply, without limitation, to all officers and employees engaged in the operation of a member's Credit Card program and to all directors of members.
(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply during periods necessary to (i)
convert a credit card program to or from the BankAmericard program or (ii) make
an adjustment to a Credit Card program as required for compliance with this section, provided such conversion or adjustment is completed in accordance with such
conditions and in such time as the corporation may require, which time shall not
exceed twelve months from (1) the effective date of this section, (2) the date of
acceptance of membership, (3) the date of delivery of notice of termination, or (4)
the date of any future acquisition, merger or other circumstances which necessitates an adjustment hereunder, as the case may be.
(f) "Credit Cards" as used in this section mean any instruments, whether in the
form of a card, book, plate, coupon, or other credit device, owned or issued by a
bank (including any of its parents, subsidiaries or affiliates) which may be used to
obtain money or to purchase or lease property or services on credit but do not
include letters of credit or any such instruments usable exclusively for the obtaining of money from such bank or the guaranteeing of checks.
(g) "Area Credit Cards" as used in this section mean any Credit Cards that are
owned, issued, serviced, and honored exclusively by one bank and honored by
merchants having a direct contractual relationship with such bank, except that such
bank may appoint any other bank as its agent with respect to the Area Credit Card
program for the sole purpose of accepting for deposit sales drafts from such
merchants arising from the use of such Area Credit Cards.
345 F. Supp. at 1312.
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2.16 forbade NBI card issuers to issue, honor, or service credit cards of
other national credit card organizations. The new rule also prohibited
NBI's agent members - the banks who merely processed credit slips for
merchants - from issuing cards of any other national credit card system.
The rule did not apply to local or regional credit cards, nor did it affect
credit cards issued by entities outside the field of banking, such as traveland-entertainment companies or department stores. In short, By-law 2.16
excluded from the NBI system any bank that issued Master Charge cards.
Worthen challenged the antiduality rule in the Eastern District of Arkansas.7 Worthen had not yet begun to issue Master Charge cards, having
agreed to stay its hand while the matter was in dispute. Accordingly, there
was no actual experience with the competitive effect of By-law 2.16. The
two parties agreed to present stipulated facts to the court, and the court
based its ruling on those stipulated facts.
It is important to keep in mind that, at the time the case was before the
district court, both credit card systems relied entirely on paper documentation. The banks processed credit slips in the same way they cleared paper
checks: that is, they transported them physically, using the facilities provided by companies in other lines of commerce (courier services, the Post
Office, and so on). The bankcard organizations had little power to improve the delivery-and-interchange mechanism. As far as they were concerned, this part of their business was governed by a static technology that
was common to them both.
But both organizations also foresaw that they would soon be able to
convert to computerized communications. In that event, the organizations
would be able to differentiate their clearing-and-delivery services and
compete on that basis. NBI and Worthen agreed to stipulate that, inasmuch as they were both studying the possibility of using EFT techniques,
this kind of systems-level competition already existed. The parties further
agreed to stipulate that this form of competition would be foreclosed if the
systems were to merge.8
Worthen rested its case on the claim that the antiduality rule amounted
to a group boycott on the part of the NBI members, the purpose and effect
of which was to inhibit Worthen from competing as vigorously as possible
against other banks for the business of consumers and merchants. NBI
rejoined that if any bank could issue both cards, the membership of NBI
and Interbank would soon become identical, and systems-level competi7. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 1309
(E.D. Ark. 1972).
8. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d at 125-26.
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tion between the two bankcards would vanish.9 The district court, apparently persuaded by Worthen's arguments, found that the antiduality rule
denied opportunities to banks that issued the Master Charge card to the
ultimate detriment of consumers and merchants: "Both merchants and
consumers will be better served if they are allowed to do business with a
bank which handles both cards. Despite NBI's arguments to the contrary,
the court believes that this will inspire even greater competition between
the two systems."'"
Nevertheless, the court felt compelled to deal with NBI's argument that
the rule would improve systems-level competition. The court quoted a
passage from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in UnitedStates v. Associated
Press." In that case, the newspapers belonging to the Associated Press
(AP) each had the power to veto applications for membership filed by any
rival newspapers. Judge Hand rejected this veto power and required the
AP to accept applicants on a nondiscriminatory basis, saying:
The argument appears to be that if all be allowed to join AP, it
may become the only news service, and get a monopoly by driving out all others. That is perhaps a possibility, though it seems
to us an exceedingly remote one; but even if it became an actuality, no public injury could result. For, if AP were open to all who
wished the service, could pay for it, and were fit to use it, it would
be no longer a monopoly: a monopoly of all those interested in
an activity is no monopoly at all, for no one is excluded and the
essence of monopoly is exclusion.' 2
The Worthen court's reliance on Judge Hand's reasoning is questionable,
considering that the Supreme Court completely revised the analysis that
Judge Hand set forth, and, in particular, declined to accept Judge Hand's
reliance on monopoly principles.' 3 But there is a still more forceful reason
9. 345 F. Supp. at 1315-17.
10. Id at 1322.
11. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aft'd, 326 U.S. I
(1945).
12. Id at 374-75.
13. Judge Hand asserted that the AP constituted a kind of partial monopoly: it had
enough market power to raise prices and exclude competitors even though it was not the
only organization of its kind in the field. He also said that the AP controlled a vital commodity - to wit, the news gathered by its members. Accordingly, drawing on the "public
utility" doctrine of United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 409
(1912), Judge Hand imposed the duties of a monoplist on the AP, and forced it to open its
doors to new members on a nondiscriminatory basis. United States v. Associated Press, 52
F. Supp. at 362, 375-76 (1943).
On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted Judge Hand's remedy, but rejected his analysis.
The Court looked upon the AP as being a collection of competitors bound together by a web
of agreements. The Court said that the AP members enjoyed enough market power to inflict
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why the Worthen court should have rejected Judge Hand's line of reasoning. In Associated Press, no one was concerned with the question of technological advances in the news-clearing industry; the AP, like its rival
news organizations, used whatever communications lines were available.
By contrast, the credit card industry stood on the threshold of major technological changes - changes that might, if allowed to develop freely, become the principal focus of competition in the market for consumer
services.
On appeal of the district court's decision,' 4 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit requested the Department of Justice to file an amicus brief.
The Department urged the court to refrain from applying a rigid per se
test:
[T]he very novelty and complexity of the questions indicate that
they should have been resolved only after a full trial. Such a trial
may establish that the result reached by the District Court is correct, and that the restraints imposed by By-Law 2.16 are

. . .

so

harmful as to be illegal per se. On the other hand, a full record
may show that the by-law is not only reasonable, but that it preserves competition between the several bank credit card systems. 15
The Eighth Circuit accepted the Justice Department's advice. The court
noted particularly that there was no way to predict, on the basis of the
record before it, how dual membership might affect the growth of new
technological systems and procedures for verifying credit cards.' 6 It therecourt's decision and directed it to test the by-law
fore reversed the district
7
by the rule of reason.'
The retrial never took place. Instead, NBI redrafted the by-law to make
it even more stringent than before and submitted it to the Department of
Justice for clearance under the Business Review Letter procedure.'" The
competitive injury on their rivals, and that they had acquired this power by pooling their
resources, not by any special productive efforts of their own. The Court further said that,
given that the AP members had power of this magnitude (although not necessarily monopoly power), their agreements would necessarily result in a competitive disadvantage for nonparticipating newspapers. The Court refused to let the AP members misuse their pooled
power in this fashion. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1945). See also
Bernard, Some Antitrust Issues Raisedby Large Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, 25 CATH.
U.L. REV. 749, 756-58 (1976).
14. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.
1973).
15. Id at 126.
16. Id at 129.
17. Id at 130.
18. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1979).
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new by-law required complete separation between NBI and Interbank,
forbidding duality not only for card issuers, but for agent banks as well.
The Justice Department proceeded very cautiously in reviewing the NBI
by-law and the credit card industry. NBI submitted its request on November 11, 1974. The Department asked for and received a number of additional submissions, and finally issued its opinion on October 7, 1975,
nearly a year after NBI's request - and just under four years from the
date that Worthen filed its complaint against NBI in the Arkansas district
court. The banking industry had changed a great deal in the meantime.
Both Interbank and NBI were already moving forward with plans for
adapting EFT to their credit card operations and for tying cards directly
into deposit accounts. EFT was also well underway in related areas. The
first automated clearing house (ACH) associations were being formed, and
the first automated teller machines (ATMs) being deployed; the debate
over the relation between the ACHs and point-of-sale (POS) systems had
already started.
II.

THE

NBI LETTER

The "NBI Letter,"' 9 as it came to be called, is one of the most important
events in the development of EFT - not so much for what it said, as for
the industry's response to it. Upon reading the Department of Justice
opinion, and thinking about the relative strengths of NBI and Interbank,
NBI decided to drop its rule against duality. It is no exaggeration to say
that the NBI Letter set the bankcard industry on the road to standardized
technology and full interchange.
Many observers believe that standardization and interchangeability are
most welcome. These conditions, they point out, make life much easier for
merchants (who can use one terminal and deal with one bank) and for
consumers (who can carry just one card, and use it anywhere). Additionally, these conditions arguably make it easier for smaller banks to enter the
bankcard field. Whatever the merits of these claims, however, standardization and interchangeability are not what the Department of Justice was
looking for in the EFT industry. In fact, the Department's later statements
suggest that it continued to hope that systems-level competition would
flourish.2" After the NBI Letter, however, there was little chance of that.
The Justice Department's NBI Letter treated revised By-law 2.16 as if it
19. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper to Francis R. Kirkham
and Allan N. Littman (October 7, 1975) (on file at the Department of Justice) [hereinafter
cited as NBI Letter].

20. See note 3 supra.
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were really two rules: first, a rule against dual membership in two organizations that produce "traditional bank credit card" services (ie., services
that rely on paper documentation and interchange); and second, a rule
against dual membership in competing EFT systems. 2 These two matters,
the letter said, raised different issues which needed to be dealt with separately.
The Department conceded it had no way to analyze the problems raised
by dual membership in competing EFT systems:
As you well know, at this point one can only conjecture what the
future holds in store in the EFTS area. Consequently, it is impossible for us at this juncture to reach any firm conclusions concerning the competitive implications of proposed By-law 2.16
insofar as it relates to debit card systems and EFTS.22
Nevertheless, the Department declared:
We are of the view that the preservation of maximum flexibility
and competitive opportunities in the EFTS field is of the utmost
importance if EFTS is to develop in a way which provides consumers with a wide range of useful and competitive services.
Thus, we are concerned that application of the proposed by-law
to debit cards might unnecessarily limit the opportunities available to NBI members to participate in alternative debit card and
EFTS developments.2 3
In sum, the Department of Justice issued a clear warning that, in the
newly-developing area of EFT, NBI's by-law risked attack.
For all their menace, however, these passages do not account for NBI's
reaction to the letter or for the profound effect the letter had on the EFT
industry. For the explanation of that effect, it is necessary to examine the
other half of the Department's analysis - that is, the discussion of paperbased credit card services. On this point, the Department said:
[T]he proposed by-law . . . automatically precludes every NBI
agent bank in any market from being an agent bank in any other
credit card system. We believe such a restriction might well
21.

NBI Letter, supra note 19, at 2. The Department confused two major distinctions in

the payment services industry: namely, the distinction between credit card and debit card
payment services on one hand, and the distinction between paper-based delivery mechanisms and EFT delivery mechanisms on the other. The Department treated debit services as

if they were identical with EFT services. It did not admit that a bank could offer credit card
services by means of EFT mechanisms, or that debit card services could exist without them.
Although a precise recognition of these distinctions might be vital in other contexts, here, the

lack of precision is only mildly confusing and does not seriously undermine the Department's reasoning.
22. Id at 3.

23.

1d
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handicap efforts to create new bank credit card systems and may
also diminish competition among the banks in various markets.24
The Department did not explain its reasoning further. Apparently, however, it believed that the by-law could make it hard to find banks that
would be eligible to process the credit slips for a new bankcard organization - particularly if Interbank were to adopt a parallel restriction. The
Department may also have believed that, unless banks could compete
freely among themselves to service merchants, the discount fees, that is, the
fees banks charged merchants for accepting credit slips, would remain
comparatively high.25
At the same time, however, the Department of Justice was content to
accept the by-law's prohibition against banks issuing both cards, even in
the context of a purely paper-based system. Once again the Department
offered no analysis. It merely stated: "We believe that the existing competition between NBI and Interbank has been procompetitive, and a prohibition of dual affiliation appears unobjectionable to the extent it is necessary
to insure continued intersystem competition."26 The Department offered
no clue as to how far that "extent" extended. On the contrary, it immediately went on to suggest that there might indeed be cases where the antiduality rule could produce anticompetitive effects by preventing a bank from
issuing both cards. The Department also suggested that NBI's entire rationale for imposing the antiduality rule was suspect on the grounds that
NBI failed to prohibit multibank holding companies from issuing different
cards through different bank subsidiaries.2 7
It is unclear why the Department decided to reject the antiduality rule in
the case of agent banks and yet retain it for card issuers. Duality among
card issuers would improve competition among banks for the patronage of
consumers to the same degree that duality among agent banks would improve competition for the patronage of merchants. Indeed, if intersystem
competition is valuable and worthy of preservation, it makes no sense to
preserve competition for the two systems in some aspects, and then to unite
the systems in other respects. The card-issuing banks would have to consider the needs of the agent banks when making innovations, while the
24. Id at 2.
25. Id

The Department said that the by-law was also suspect because it prevented card

issuers in one system from serving as agent banks in another. This observation, along with
the Department's remark that the antiduality rule "might well handicap efforts to create new
bank credit card systems," follows the final remarks of the Eighth Circuit in sending the
dispute back for an evidentiary trial. See Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 485 F.2d at 130.
26.
27.

NBI Letter, supra note 19, at 2.
Id at 2-3.
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agent banks would resist changes that would not apply equally to both
bankcards.
Still harder to explain is what the Department meant by "the existing
competition between NBI and Interbank."2 8 It is true that, during the year
that the Department was studying By-law 2.16, both NBI and Interbank
were working to develop EFT capability and to improve their in-house
clearing mechanisms. The Department insisted, however, that it was talking about something else. In the very next sentence, it declared: "It should
be emphasized, however, that our views in this regard are based on an
analysis of the bank credit card system as it presently exists and on the
general impact of such a prohibition [against duality]." 2 9 Furthermore, the
Department rigorously divided its discussion of the by-law into two parts,
and placed this passage in the portion that dealt with "traditional" or paper-based bankcard arrangements.
As long as both NBI and Interbank relied on an identical and static
technology to deliver payment services, there was little that either bankcard group could do to differentiate its own services. Indeed, any differentiation might have reduced competition rather than increased it by
encouraging merchants and cardholders to carry more than one card, even
when the card services were essentially identical. At most, differentiation
could help to create separate but parallel markets for the two bankcard
organizations.
Whatever the rationale of the Justice Department letter, the underlying
message was apparent: NBI could forbid duality among card issuers, but
not among agent banks. This ruling amounted to a vindication of the original membership rules that Worthen had challenged four years earlier.
The only major difference was that NBI could no longer prevent card issuers from acting as agent banks for the rival organizations.
This "partial duality" might have made sense in 1971, when paper interchange was the only available method for clearing bankcard data. But
it no longer made sense in 1975, with EFT looming on the horizon. NBI
had originally hoped to develop a unique set of standards for bankcards,
terminals, and data communications among the NBI members - thus
linking card issuers and agent banks in a common enterprise to deliver a
unique service. When the Department insisted on duality for agent banks,
however, it automatically created a large constituency for maintaining
identical technology in the two systems. It would hardly have made sense
for the agent banks to deploy two separate terminals and to maintain two
28. Id at 2.
29. Id

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 30:65

different sets of procedures for the two bankcard systems. At the same
time, the agent banks would be loath to give up the advantages of servicing
all the debit card business of their merchant clients. With the Justice Department on their side, and with merchants lobbying for a universal terminal that could handle both bankcards, agent banks were in a commanding
position to enforce their point of view.
Initially, NBI modified its by-laws to conform to the recommendations
of the NBI Letter. After a while, however, NBI apparently had second
thoughts about competing against Interbank in a world where all banks
could belong to both systems. NBI had confidence that its own methods
for clearing information among banks, and its inherent strengths as an organization, would give it an advantage over Interbank in servicing the
needs of card issuers and agent banks. In view of these considerations,
NBI decided to withdraw from the retail end of the bankcard business and
concentrate on the switching-and-transmitting end. Accordingly, NBI
opened its membership to all banks.
The demise of the antiduality rule has virtually guaranteed that the
bankcard industry will become highly interconnected and that bankcard
products will become comparatively standardized. So long as any distinction at all remains between bankcards, each card issuer has the incentive to
issue both cards to its customers. But neither the card issuers nor the agent
banks that handle both cards have any reason to treat the cards differently
for their own internal purposes. Accordingly, the industry seems to be
moving toward a single bankcard of standard size and shape, with a magnetic strip on its reverse side encoded with information meeting certain
industry-wide standards. Similarly, the trend seems to be toward a single
terminal that can accept and read both cards.
As the bankcards and the terminals have grown more standardized, the
clearing mechanism that acts as intermediary between the card issuers and
the agent banks has grown apart from the other components of bankcard
systems. Both NBI and Interbank already clear credit information among
banks without distinguishing which of the cards has been used in a transaction. Furthermore, the clearing industry has grown more competitive
and diverse. Third-party data processing companies, such as Tymshare
Transaction Services, have moved aggressively into the field.
The entry of third-party processors into the bankcard services field is a
most significant event. Financial institutions (and organizations of
financial institutions) have dominated the field and have naturally concentrated their efforts on their own highly specialized needs. Third-party
processors do not have to take so parochial a view. They can treat bank-
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card clearing as just one communications service among many and use the
same facilities to clear bankcard items as they use for transmitting other
kinds of data.
It is not at all certain whether these third-party intermediaries have a
cost advantage over "pure" EFT systems dedicated entirely to bankcard
services. The third-party intermediaries may be able to spread their costs
over a much higher volume of messages, but a "pure" EFT system may not
require the same capacity or technical capability as a general-purpose data
communications system. What is certain, however, is that the clearing
mechanisms available to the bankcard industry are becoming more varied,
more competitive, and more independent of the other parts of bankcard
systems.3 °
III.

MARKET-WIDE ACCESS AND INTERCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS

While the Department of Justice was considering the NBI case, it was
also reviewing a bankcard scheme based on principles of "full duality":
namely, the plan of the Nebraska Electronic Terminal System (NETS).
NETS was an organization of commercial banks in Nebraska that wanted
to establish a network of POS terminals and ATMs throughout the state.
NETS was willing to accept any Nebraska commercial bank as a member
and, in fact, hoped that all of them would join its system. But it refused to
accept thrift institutions or out-of-state banks.31
Recognizing that a joint venture of this magnitude could raise competitive questions, NETS submitted its proposal to the Department of Justice
for review, as NBI had done earlier. NETS filed its request on June 2,
1975. Almost two years later, after a series of changes in the arrangements
the NETS
among the NETS members, the Department refused to approve
32
request. The Department said the venture was too large.
The Department based its criticism primarily on the fact that NETS
members collectively held over eighty-five percent of the commercial bank
deposits in the state. The Department had no quarrel with the particular
arrangements among the NETS members and did not claim that they were
more restrictive than necessary to establish a bankcard system. On the
contrary, the Department took special note that NETS allowed its members to develop specialized bankcard services on a competitive basis within
30. For an interesting and well-informed review of this entire matter, see Baker, Bank
CardSystems are Not Immune to 4ntitrust Act, But Futureis Unclear, AMERICAN BANKER,
vol. 164, no. 192, at 5 (October 4, 1979).
31. NETS Letter, supra note 3.
32. Id.
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the framework of NETS. 33 Nor did the Department look upon NETS as
an illegal attempt to monopolize the bankcard market. The Department
recognized that Nebraska thrift institutions could offer competing bankcard services on their own. The gravamen of the Department's objections
was simply that NETS was bigger than it needed to be:
We do not believe that the available evidence supports the necessity of an all-encompassing joint venture. Indeed, some evidence
is to the contrary. A savings and loan association and several of
the larger Nebraska commercial banks, acting alone, have either
designed and operated EFT systems or are in the process of doing so. The degree of risk, the amount of capital required, and
the economies of scale involved in constructing EFT systems all of which are often cited as justification for joint ventures - do
not necessarily suggest the need for a joint venture of the dimension of NETS.3 4
The Department dismissed NETS' effort to preserve intrasystem competition among the NETS participants with the remark that: "NETS in effect
will collectively define the range of EFT services available, which obviously retards individual system initiatives in designing competitivelybased service offerings tailored to meet particular customer needs."3 The
excessive size of NETS and the retardation of competition were the only
two objections that the Department mentioned. Both amounted to the
same thing: the Department thought that NETS members should form
two or more smaller systems that would compete against one another on
the basis of technological innovations.
The Department's objections to NETS do not stand up under scrutiny.
For one thing, the NETS Letter contained no analysis of the demand side
of the market for NETS' services. It is all very well to say that the degree
of risk, the capital requirements, and the scale economies of bankcard systems - that is, the supply side of the question - do not intrinsically require banks to form massive joint ventures. On the other hand, if
Nebraska3 6 cannot provide enough transactional volume to support more
37
than one system, these supply-side factors are moot.
33.

Id at 2. See also Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485

F.2d at 130.
34. NETS Letter, supra note 3, at 2.

35. Id at 3.
36. The Department implicitly accepted NETS' assertion that the state of Nebraska

constituted the appropriate geographic market for EFT services. The Department had no
need to do more for its own purposes. But the assertion should not be accepted without
question.
37. By mentioning "scale economies," the Department seems to imply that it had some
notion of the range over which economies are to be calculated. It may equally be the case,
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In addition, the Department's Letter did not evaluate the competitive
influence expected from the Nebraska thrift institutions, nor did it consider
the possibility of entry by out-of-state systems. Even if most of the banks
in Nebraska had joined NETS, out-of-state bankcard systems might still
have been able to penetrate the Nebraska market by forming ties with the
few banks (especially the large ones) that did not belong to NETS, and by
allying with the thrift institutions excluded by NETS. Furthermore, outof-state bankcard systems with only small local connections might have
been able to compete effectively against NETS by emphasizing credit extensions rather than direct-debit services. The NETS members and the
excluded institutions might not have been perfectly equivalent, but some
competitive influence could have been felt.
Finally, the Justice Department came perilously close to implying that it
considered NETS (and all other large-scale systems like it) illegal per se.
As the Department asserted:
[W]e recogize that NETS can be a means of providing EFT services to all commercial banks in the state, regardless of size or
location. On balance, however, and after careful analysis, we
cannot conclude that these positive attributes outweigh the potential anticompetitive effects of the proposed joint venture.3"
The letter contained no estimate of the actual magnitude of these "positive
attributes" in the Nebraska market. Accordingly, this passage is ambiguous at best. The Department's internal analysis may have dealt with the
special conditions prevailing in Nebraska, but the NETS Letter itself the public statement issued to the world - spoke only of the type and
character of the "positive attributes," not their weight, thereby indicating
that these "positive attributes" by their very nature would be inadequate to
offset the competitive burdens NETS would impose.
On the other side of the scale, the Justice Department considered only
one kind of detriment: that is, intra-NETS restraints. The NETS Letter
did not consider the value of those restraints in the context of a market that
might have included other systems. Competition from systems run by
thrift institutions, or the chance for entry by outside bankcard systems,
might not have reduced the anticompetitive effects of the NETS arrangements among the member banks, but such competition might well have
however, that the Department only meant to say that EFT systems are not natural monopolies - that is, the Department may only be saying that the appropriate size for EFT systems
(given an adequate volume of transactions) is small enough that small-scale joint ventures
enjoy all the efficiencies of ventures the size of NETS. Because the Department put scale
economies in the same list with the factors of risk and of capital requirements, the second
interpretation would appear to be the correct one.
38. NETS Letter, supra note 3, at 3.
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mitigated the overall anticompetitive effect on the market. In that case, the
"positive attributes" of NETS might be deemed more valuable - valuable
enough even to have justified NETS, provided the external competition
was sufficient.
As written, however, the NETS Letter establishes a standard no largescale bankcard system could ever meet. In effect, the Letter said that
bankcard systems foreclosed competition among those who participated in
them; that no "positive attributes" could overbalance these intragroup restraints; and that no factors apart from the intragroup restraints were to be
considered. The logic of the NETS Letter would forbid all large bankcard
formed, no matter how many other systems they might
systems from being
39
against.
compete
The real difficulty with the NETS Letter does not lie in its analysis, however, but rather in its vision of the bankcard industry. The Department of
Justice implicitly assumed that each bankcard system is a unique entity
with its own costs, its own scale economies, and its own special advantages
over rival systems. Furthermore, the Department assumed that bankcard
systems are designed for financial purposes and serve a financial market:
accordingly, only banks would be interested in operating systems of this
kind or would have the ability to do so. If competition were to be preserved, given these postulates, a number of systems would have to be created, each one formed by a separate group of banks, and each one
independent of the others.
Had the NBI Letter never been written, the Justice Department might
well have been able to rely on these assumptions and to carry forward its
campaign for systems-level competition. For all its faults, the NETS Letter was fundamentally sound. It rested on a clear idea of the competitive
forces at work in the bankcard market; its hypotheses about the nature of
bankcard technology were accurate enough for the time, and it properly
concentrated on promoting a favorable climate for innovation. Moreover,
the NETS Letter's message - that the Department did not like marketwide systems - was simple enough and straightforward enough to provide
an understandable guide to the public.
39. One must keep in mind that a Business Review Letter is not the same thing as a
court ruling, or even as a decision by a regulatory agency. A Letter merely states the Department's present evaluation of the competitive effects of a proposed arrangement, and
reveals the Department's present intentions on the question whether to bring suit against the
parties to it. Nevertheless, many people are willing to give the Department's letters a
broader significance. They react to a Letter as if it were in the nature of an interpretive
ruling under the Department's "governing statute" - that is, the antitrust laws. Accordingly, the practical effect of a Letter is often the same as if it were in fact an interpretive
ruling.
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The bankcard industry might well be more competitive, and the consumers and merchants better served, in a world where bankcard groups are
forced to compete against one another on the basis of the quality of their
systems' delivery mechanisms. Each system would be forced to respond to
the shifting needs of its customers - merchants and cardholders alike as rapidly as possible, or find itself displaced by a rival system. Each system would be compelled to adopt new technology in order to stay abreast
of its market. Furthermore, systems-level competition would offer the
greatest opportunity for consumers to exert control over the banks producing bankcard services. Each consumer could (as many now do) carry several bankcards. When the consumer chose between competing stores such as rival supermarkets - he could take their payment mechanisms
into account in deciding where to go: that is, he could make his choice at
least in part on the basis of how easy it would be to pay for his goods at the
check-out counter. If a merchant found that his customers were going
elsewhere because other stores' bankcard services were better, the
merchant would have a strong reason to put pressure on the supplier of his
own bankcard service, and the supplier would have the best of all reasons
to improve it. In this way, consumers would be able to exercise a meaningful choice among bankcards and to have that choice make an impression
on the banks producing bankcard services.
That was not to be the case, however. The NBI Letter reached the industry first. By the time the NETS Letter was written, the bankcard industry had already taken the first steps toward an entirely new structure.
Duality had established a toehold; card-reading technology was beginning
to standardize on the basis of magnetic-strip encoding, and the switchingand-transmission functions were already beginning to disengage from the
card-issuing and terminal-deploying functions.
In the time since the NBI and NETS Letters were written, the bankcard
industry has continued its metamorphosis. Technology in data communications has advanced. Companies that can provide services of this kind
have proliferated and are willing to serve the financial industry as well as
any other sector of commerce. It is no longer possible to look upon the
bankcard industry as a separate and indivisible line of commerce, having
its own cast of competitors and its own special characteristics. Today a
bankcard system is really an agglomeration of many separate services,
each of which is fairly independent of the others, and some of which extend far beyond the financial realm.
Perhaps the most significant change is that it is no longer true that arrangements like NETS "obviously retard" the growth of specialized or
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competitive bankcard systems. Arrangements like NETS may indeed impose a more-or-less standardized technology for card-reading on the members of the group; that much is needed for interchangeability. But the
standardization can end right there. Today a subgroup of banks might be
able to deploy terminals with special capabilities and purchase clearing
services for themselves from an independent source, and yet continue to
belong to the market-wide system. So long as their terminals continue to
accept the cards of other banks, and so long as they continue to interconnect with the other banks through the market-wide system, the subgroup
can develop unique bankcard services without having to withdraw from
the market-wide system.
The critical question is the cost of forming the alternative arrangement.
That cost is much lower today where a vigorous and competitive data communications industry stands ready to clear bankcard information than it
was in the early days of EFT when banks had to depend on their own
technological resources. Moreover, the extra volume of transactions that
the new terminals can handle by virtue of being connected to a marketwide system can help to justify their cost. Accordingly, arrangements like
NETS might actually encourage innovation by reducing the cost and the
risk of experimentation.
Market-wide arrangements can also help to promote competition in
other ways - notably in price rivalry. Each bank must compete against
every other bank for the patronage of each consumer and merchant.
Moreover, every bank - no matter how small - can take advantage of
the scale economies of the entire system to reduce its prices. The market
price for service is likely to fall to the level determined by the common
system's endemic cost characteristics, and every bank would have the incentive to provide the highest quality service to its customers.
This line of analysis does not lead automatically to the conclusion that
market-wide bankcard systems are immune to antitrust attack. If the arrangements are unduly restrictive, for example, or if the membership rules
are discriminatory, or if the arrangements are being used as a cover for
fixing prices or allocating markets, the participants could be exposed to
liability. But it does suggest that bankers can pursue market-wide arrangements with a great deal more confidence than in the past. A plaintiff, such
as the Department of Justice, will find it much harder to show that a market-wide system restrains competition to an unreasonable degree.
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FEDERAL RESERVE PARTICIPATION IN BANKCARD OPERATIONS

If market-wide bankcard systems are not synonymous with a reduction
in competitive vigor, these systems can be considered in the context of
other kinds of EFT mechanisms - notably the Federal Reserve's ACH
operations. The Federal Reserve does not currently process very many
bankcard transactions through its ACHs: The ACHs, being off-line, 4" do
not lend themselves to this sort of task. Accordingly, bankcard clearing
systems have developed apart from and parallel to the Federal Reserve's
facilities.
It may no longer make sense to insist on keeping a sharp line between
Federal Reserve operations and bankcard services, however. The Federal
Reserve has recently begun to upgrade its data communications network
to full on-line capability. When this changeover is complete, the Federal
Reserve's ACHs may have scale economies that can be realized more fully
when bankcard volume is processed through them. Conversely, some
kinds of bankcard services might be made cheaper if they can take advantage of an ACH's extra capacity.
The economic objections to this kind of arrangement are threefold. It is
said that it is improper and unnecessary for the Federal Reserve to spend
its resources clearing bankcard items when private businesses stand ready
to do so. It is also said that the Federal Reserve's mere presence in the
bankcard field is objectionable because, being immune to the normal kind
of business pressures that affect a private sector competitor, the Federal
Reserve distorts the market for bankcard clearing services. Finally, it is
argued that the Federal Reserve cannot really be expected to price its
clearing services properly, no matter how hard it tries.4 If the services are
priced too low (as seems likely), private competitors will be deterred from
entering the field, and banks will overinvest in services that employ the
Federal Reserve facilities.
The first two points are not really debatable on economic grounds. They
amount to a policy conclusion that antitrust considerations should outweigh other factors. Nevertheless, there are several affirmative reasons for
the Federal Reserve to provide support to bankcard services. Bankcard
40. The essence of a point-of-sale EFT payment is that verification of the customer's

ability to pay, and the payment itself, are both completed at once. Sending an item through
an off-line ACH entails a substantial delay, and destroys the advantage of risk-free, on-thespot payment.
41. The Federal Reserve has issued a proposed schedule of prices for its services, including its ACH services, as required by DIDMCA § 107. See FederalReserve Bank Services; ProposedFee Schedules andPricingPrinciples, Docket No. R-0324, 45 Fed. Reg. 58,689
(1980) [hereinafter cited as PricingProposal].
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services are a part of the national payments mechanism: they may require
a different kind of apparatus from that needed to clear traditional paper
items, but, in the end, they perform the same basic functions as paper instruments.
Perhaps the two most important qualities of the traditional payments
mechanism are its universality and reliability. If the Federal Reserve were
to provide clearing facilities for bankcard services, these services would
acquire the same qualities. The very fact that the Federal Reserve is not a
private company provides an extra measure of assurance that electronic
clearing facilities will continue to be available for this purpose. In sum,
while there might be certain costs in having government-operated clearing
systems of this kind - perhaps even higher costs than would be the case if
only private companies were to clear bankcard transactions - there are
certain public benefits as well. At bottom, the decision to have a government-operated EFT network is a political one in which economic considerations must be balanced against other values.
The last point - namely, that the Federal Reserve is likely to upset the
bankcard market by underpricing its bankcard services - is a straightforward economic argument, but one that has much less force today than in
the past.42 It is true enough that one cannot expect the Federal Reserve to
set its prices exactly as a private-sector competitor would. As the Depart42. Before the adoption of DIDMCA, the Federal Reserve might have been able to
look upon its prices as being mere administered fees, set for purposes that could be identified
by the effects they produced. Under this view, the Federal Reserve would pay the entire
costs of operating its ACHs out of general revenues. It would then set its prices with the
object of achieving a broad spectrum of public interest goals, of which recovering costs and

promoting competition would be only two among many. This kind of pricing scheme might
not be particularly successful in allocating resources efficiently. It might, however, produce
public benefits of a much different nature from those that a market-oriented schedule could
generate: most notably, the public benefit of encouraging banks to belong to the Federal
Reserve System. The decision to emphasize these other kinds of benefits at the expense of

competition and efficiency in EFT services is essentially political in character, and - like
the decision to have a federal presence in the EFT industry at all -

not confined to the

realm of antitrust policy.
Under DIDMCA, however, this approach to price setting is no longer available. The new
law requires the Federal Reserve to cover the fully allocated costs of providing services out
of the prices it charges for them (with some qualifications). See DIDMCA § 107. There is

bound to be some argument over what costs should be considered and what kinds of projections are reasonable to make. But the basic fact is that the Federal Reserve must base its

prices on economic factors; it may not ignore economics in favor of other considerations.
Accordingly, it is fair to judge the Federal Reserve's prices by their influence on the market
for clearing services and on any derivative markets that might be affected by the character of
the clearing industry, notwithstanding the possibility that a price which seems improper or

uneconomic might serve other public interests.

1980]

Bankcard Competition

ment of Justice has pointed out, the Federal Reserve is likely to be subject
to a variety of pressures when it comes to establishing rates:
Our experience with rate regulation in the public sector suggests
that the Board will be under constant pressure to adjust fees in
order to accommodate non-economic influences. Special interests will ask for special considerations. Member banks may ask
for extra benefits and low rates; those who face peculiar competitive circumstances may plead for favorable treatment; large institutions with many items may request rates that are volumesensitive while institutions close to the ACH may ask for rates
that are sensitive to distance; smaller and more remote institutions may demand equal treatment. Resisting the pressures of
special interests will not be easy. 3
Furthermore, as the Department has noted, the Federal Reserve will be
compelled "to establish some form of supervisory authority in order to
prevent discriminatory and uneconomic pricing mechanisms from coming
into being."" Any such bureaucracy will entail extra administrative costs
and will generate added delays in making price changes. These costs are
peculiar to the government. Private-sector companies do not have to respond to outside pressures in the same formalized way that government
agencies do; it is all too easy for those who benefit from an out-of-date
price to use the administrative process to delay its modification. A proper
pricing scheme should take these added costs into account.
If the Federal Reserve is not willing to recognize the special burdens
that go with its status as a government agency, it is quite ready to accept
any benefits that derive from it. For example, in its proposed fee schedule
for check-clearing and ACH services, it estimates the cost of capital and
debt at rates below those available to private companies, and far below
those available to newer and smaller companies that might like to enter the
field. It also assumes that it will enjoy a nearly total penetration of the
market for ACH-divertible items. Private sector companies would be unable to predicate their charges on either of these assumptions; their charges
per item might have to be somewhat higher, and their market penetration
correspondingly lower. In sum, the Federal Reserve's prices are likely to
be improperly low, and to some degree anticompetitive.4 5
43.

Comments of the Department of Justice at 11, Collection of Checks and Other

Items by Federal Reserve Banks, supra note 3.
44. Id
45. The Federal Reserve bases its schedule on three sets of figures: its own historical
costs for assets; its projections of ACH volumes; and its 1979 figures for the costs of long-

term debt, short-term debt, and after-tax return on equity. Each of these sets of figures
seems to contain a bias toward the low side, with the result that the fees are likewise low.
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The prospect that the Federal Reserve will underprice its services might
First, the historical costs of assets are likely to be lower than the replacement costs - that
is, lower than the costs a would-be entrant would have to incur using new equipment. In
addition, the Federal Reserve seems to calculate the costs of "assets employed in the production of priced services" improperly. It determines the ratio of expenses incurred in providing priced services to total System costs (43.2%; but no cost figures are given). Then it
applies the ratio, not to total System assets (also not given), but only to mixed-service assets
- that is, to assets used in producing both priced and nonpriced services ($659.5 million).
Presumably the ratio of priced-service expenses to mixed-service expenses would be higher
than 43.2%; and the proper estimate for the priced-service assets would be larger than the
$284.9 million given by the Federal Reserve. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 58,695.
Second, the Federal Reserve candidly admits that "the fee schedule proposed for ACH
services reflects System costs in a mature volume environment," and that it has used this
approach in order "[t]o encourage the development of electronic funds transfer." 45 Fed.
Reg. at 58,691. In other words, right from the start the Federal Reserve has based its fees on
the highest volume of ACH items it can ever expect, not on the volume that a prudent
businessman would have to estimate for the next year or two. The Federal Reserve further
inflates its estimated volume by making no provision - or at least not acknowledging any
provision - for the competitive impact of other EFT systems. Presumably some of the
items now flowing through the check-clearing system will be handled, not by the Federal
Reserve's ACHs (even when upgraded to on-line capability), but by independent EFT networks. Anyone planning to offer clearing services in competition with the Federal Reserve's
facilities would have to make a calculation of this kind - and of course would have to
estimate the volume of ACH-divertible items that the Federal Reserve would retain. In
short, the Federal Reserve is using its monopoly position to justify a schedule of prices that
seems unreasonably low, and which will entrench its monopoly all the more strongly.
Third, the Federal Reserve's figures for the cost of debt (long-term, 7.98%; short-term,
6.91%) and for the after-tax return on equity (14.4%) are much too low. See 45 Fed. Reg. at
58,695. The Federal Reserve says these figures represent average 1979 costs at twelve large
banks. The Federal Reserve then uses these figures to derive the "private sector adjustment"
by applying them to a capital structure "assumed to approximate that of a private business
firm solely providing payments function services: 53% debt (32% short-term, 21% long-term)
and 47% equity." Id The Federal Reserve does not explain these figures in any detail
whatever: for example, it does not say whether the "short-term" debt includes long-term
paper within a year or whether the rate represents a five-year average of short-term rates.
Nor does the Federal Reserve explain why bank-derived figures are appropriate in calculating the costs attributable to a nonbank enterprise. Nevertheless, using this analysis the Federal Reserve comes up with a private sector adjustment factor of 12%.
By contrast, a recent study by Koot & Walker, which examined 123 bank service corporations, suggests a much different picture. Koot & Walker found that the capital structure of
these corporations was close to the estimate used by the Federal Reserve: they put the debtto-assets ratio higher (56.2%) and the equity-to-assets ratio lower (43.8%), but noted that the
firms' individual reports varied considerably. Koot & Walker further noted that many of
these firms pay about 1% above the banks' prime interest rate for their debt. They also
found that the median after-tax return on capital for the firms was 21.5%, a far cry from the
Federal Reserve's 12-bank average. See Koot & Walker, The Mark-up in Pricing of Federal
Reserve Services 4 ISSUES IN BANK REGULATION 21 (1980); see also Koot & Walker, On the
Mark-Up in Pricingof FederalReserve Services (March, 1980) (unpublished paper on file at
the Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.) Using current market prices for debt (short-term 11.5%;
long-term 13.5%) without the premium urged by Koot & Walker for small borrowers, using
Koot & Walker's estimated pretax median return on capital for bank service corporations
(28.7%), and using the Federal Reserve's own methodology - including perforce its ultra-
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once have been sufficient justification for keeping the Federal Reserve out
of ACH operations, and more than sufficient reason to block its processing
bankcard items.4 6 However, the Federal Reserve no longer poses so great
a threat to the development of competitive and efficient EFT systems. The
most important difference is that the data communications industry has
come into its own. Companies in this field continue to generate new kinds
of services that can be adapted to the needs of the financial community.
Accordingly, the Federal Reserve's prices, even if artificially low, do not
constitute a bar to innovation in EFT technology. Innovation goes forward in parallel markets where the Federal Reserve does not intrude.
To some extent, of course, artificially low prices may constitute a barrier
to entry by data communications systems into the EFT market. So long as
the Federal Reserve's prices are not too far off the mark - that is, so long
as the prices represent a good faith attempt to reflect the Federal Reserve's
actual costs - the barrier is not likely to be very high. For one thing, costs
of data communications and data processing have been declining, and
their quality has been improving. For another, rival systems may be able
to take advantage of scale economies deriving from their nonfinancial data
communications business. At the very least, it seems clear that the Federal
Reserve's pricing would be less of a deterrent to communications companies which have other markets to serve than it would be to financial institutions. Besides, the potential entrants are no lightweights: many, notably
Bell Telephone and GTE Telenet, have ample resources of their own.
It is also possible that, if the Federal Reserve sets its prices artificially
low estimate for priced-service assets - the private-sector adjustment ought to set at 18.4%.
Any upward shift in the estimate for priced-service assets would have a proportionate effect
on the adjustment factor.
In sum, the Federal Reserve's estimated costs and proposed adjustment factor seem too
low, while its estimated volume seems too high. Under these conditions, the fees themselves
are improper and anticompetitive.
46. In a parallel case, the Federal Reserve has not charged any fees for clearing paper
checks. This policy may have delayed the coming of ACH technology in two ways: first, by
deterring banks from building their own ACHs as soon as they became economical; second,
by making it harder for ACHs to cost-justify themselves in any but the very largest markets.
The reason for this is that, so long as the Federal Reserve holds check-interchange costs at
zero, ACHs cannot save banks any money, at least not for interchange itself. The ACHs
may make it possible for them to streamline their own back-office procedures for handling
payment items, but the total savings on each item is smaller than it would have been otherwise. Accordingly, the banks would have to divert an exceptionally large volume of items
through an ACH in order to save enough in other ways to pay the costs of building and
running it. This effect reinforces itself: the higher-than-otherwise volume requires a largerthan-otherwise ACH to handle it, which in turn requires an even greater volume of ACHdivertible items to sustain it. The result is that the break-even point, in terms both of volume
and of investment, is increased to more than it would have been had the Federal Reserve
charged an appropriate fee for its check-clearing services.
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low, banks will overinvest in the services (including bankcard services)
that depend on ACH processing. But EFT services are very new; it will be
a long time before they grow beyond the point of optimum use and banks
can be said to be misallocating resources in any long-term sense. Moreover, so long as the Federal Reserve comes reasonably close to charging
cost-based prices, the banks' investment in ACH-dependent services is
bound to stay within reasonable limits.
As a matter of policy, however, it would be best for the Federal Reserve
to set its prices on the high side rather than on the low. Overpricing will
not only encourage private companies to enter the market for bankcard
clearing services, but will also reduce the amount of resources that the
Federal Reserve has to commit to this field since the Federal Reserve's
facilities will not have to handle such high volumes of items. Moreover,
higher prices will also help to compensate for some of the more inchoate
costs of governmental intrusion, such as the increased costs of decisionmaking.
V.

GEOGRAPHIC LIMITATIONS ON BANKCARD TERMINALS

The rules that govern the use of remote bankcard terminals are not uniform. The states have their own rules, which apply only to state-chartered
institutions, and which vary from one state to the next. The federal rules
are almost as diverse. The National Credit Union Administration's rules
are apparently quite liberal, as they allow federal credit unions to establish
bankcard terminals wherever they like, without giving prior notice.47 Federal savings and loan associations may establish bankcard facilities
throughout their home states, but not across state lines, and in any event
not more than five miles from a brick-and-mortar branch. 48 National
banks have the strictest rules of all. They must comply with the McFadden Act 49 which requires them to conform to state branching laws when
offering bankcard services through remote EFT terminals.5" If a state has
special rules for terminals, however, they are considered part of the state's
"branching laws," and national banks enjoy the same privileges as state
banks.5 '
47. 45 Fed. Reg. 32,292 (1980).
48. 12 C.F.R. § 545.14-5(c)(6) (1979). But see 45 Fed. Reg. 31,050 (1980).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1976).
50. The McFadden Act restricts check-paying, loan-making, and deposit-taking facili-

ties. Id All bankcard terminals perform at least one of these functions, and any one function is enough to bring a bankcard terminal within the McFadden Act's restrictions. See
Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862
(1976).
51. 534 F.2d at 948-49 (dictum).
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Many observers believe the McFadden Act's limitations are too restrictive for EFT technology. The National Commission on Electronic Funds
Transfer (NCEFT), for example, called upon Congress to adopt a new and
entirely separate set of rules for EFT services - rules that would apply
uniformly to all institutions. The NCEFT recommended that any institution be eligible to deploy EFT terminals throughout its home state and
areas" that it serves, even when the market
throughout "natural market
52
lines.
state
areas cross
Those who endorse controls on bankcard terminals assert that the tern.inals could give big banks a tremendous advantage over small ones. They
point out that the terminals perform most of the basic functions of fullservice branches: customers can deposit money into them, withdraw
money from them, borrow money through them from an established line
of credit, use them to transfer funds from one account to another, and
perform many other regular transactions. Accordingly, in their view, the
same controls are needed for bankcard terminals as for full-scale branches.
Otherwise big banks could flood the markets of their smaller rivals and
penetrate new markets from which state laws and the McFadden Act are
designed to exclude them. Ultimately, the banking industry could be dominated by a few nationwide chains of money-center banks. Smaller banks
would either be absorbed into the chains or fail.
Those who disapprove of the controls on bankcard terminals reject all
these claims. They argue that bankcard terminals have entirely different
competitive effects from those caused by full-scale branches. Terminal
networks do not represent a significant threat apart from full-scale
branches, because too many aspects of bankcard service require personal
contact between the banker and his client. 3 Accordingly, there is no reason to have special restrictions on the terminals themselves. The branching restrictions automatically limit the scope of any bankcard network.
Moreover, say these critics, bankcard systems have scale economies that
can only be realized if the systems can serve multistate markets.5 4 Many
local markets (even statewide markets) simply do not have enough volume
to sustain several competitive systems. Banks should be allowed to deploy
terminal systems throughout a region and be able to compete head-to-head
52.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER,

EFT

IN THE UNITED

STATES 75-101 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NCEFT FINAL REPORT].
53. NCEFT FINAL REPORT 107-11; see also Eisenbeiss, The Competitive Implications
Associated With the Use of Electronic Terminals, Research Papersin Banking and Economics
(Sept. 1977) (on file with Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. System).
54. See, e.g, W. BAXTER, P. COOTNER & K. Scorr, RETAIL BANKING IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE (1977).
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in each local market within it. Banks could then serve merchants in other
states (as they do now by mail), and could compete for the EFT business of
multistate chain stores. In addition, banks could serve their cardholders in
places where natural market areas cut across state lines.
Finally, these critics deny that big banks will drive the smaller ones out
of business. They point out that small banks are often wel l-established in
their local markets and have built-in advantages in competing against outof-area rivals. They note that the cost of deploying terminals and issuing
cards is low enough for smaller banks to offer bankcard services of their
own. Indeed, EFT capability may even be more valuable to a smaller
bank than to a larger one, as the costs of expanding service by use of EFT
are lower than those of expanding by full-scale branches. Small banks can
cut their bankcard costs still further by forming joint ventures with other
banks in the area. Besides, say these critics, banks that operate big bankcard systems are more likely to court small banks for business they can
bring to the system than to try to drive them from the field. In addition, if
the ordinary forces of competition are insufficient to guard small banks
against predatory practices, the small banks can invoke the antitrust
laws.5 5
Whatever the merits of these opposing claims, they lose much of their
force in the context of a third-party clearing arrangement. In Independent
Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 56 Judge Wilkey drew a distinction between facilities "established (i e., owned or rented) by a bank" and facilities established by third parties.5 7 The former would qualify as branches; the latter
would not. Federal regulators have seized on this point in their rules for
shared bankcard terminals. The Comptroller of the Currency and the
FDIC both indicate that a bank needs to make a formal branch application for a terminal, pursuant to the requirements of the McFadden Act,
only when the bank owns or leases the terminal itself.5 8
This approach - if it survives challenge59 - opens the door to full re55. See generally NCEFT FINAL REPORT 103-11, 133-34.
56.
57.
58.

534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
Id at 951.
Letter from Chief Counsel John Shockey, Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-

rency, to [name withheld] (Aug. I, 1978) (on file at the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency); 12 C.F.R. § 303.14(l)(2)(i) (1980).
59. In the Independent Banker's Ass'n case, Judge Wilkey stressed the broad language

and fundamental policies that the Supreme Court articulated in First Nat'l Bank in Plant
City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969). He insisted that private arrangements should not
control the question whether a bank is offering banking services - receiving and disbursing
funds - to its customers, in any given spot, and doing so through facilities that give the
bank a competitive edge over its rivals. It is equally true that Judge Wilkey emphasized the
matter of responsibility for the terminals, which he framed in terms of ownership or control.
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gional EFT systems. Any bank could buy intermediary services from a
third party and conform to the standards for access and interchange established by that company. It could then issue cards compatible with the terminals deployed by others using that company's services - merchants and
banks alike. It could also permit other banks' customers to use its own
terminals. There would be no suggestion of an implicit responsibility for
one bank's terminals on the part of another, as there might be if the banks
worked together to form a system themselves.6 °
Furthermore, the economic arguments on both sides are much weaker
when banks can purchase intermediary services from third parties. A
small bank can defend itself against a large bank that is trying to invade its
market because the small bank has access to EFT clearing mechanisms
that are every bit as advanced and as widely used as those of the intruder,
and can use them to offer EFT services in a market where it has already
established itself. Conversely, however, the branching laws do not prevent
the growth of scale economies in EFT systems. The intermediaries have
their own scale economies, which are determined by their own costs and
overall volume (perhaps including nonbankcard items). The intermediaries might be able to process transactions for several local bankcard systems, all of which conform to state branching rules, and still offer
the advantages of consolidated volume to each of them.
For all this, it remains true that the McFadden Act and IBAA v. Smith
put constraints on proprietary EFT systems, including systems jointly
owned by several banks. To that extent, the branching laws may still generate higher prices, not by affecting the cost structure of the bankcard systems, but by limiting competition among them. But the magnitude of this
effect is hard to gauge, and in any event is likely to be fairly small. The
laws restricting brick-and-mortar branches are (for the moment at least) an
established part of the landscape of banking. If proprietary bankcard terminals cannot exert much influence apart from a supporting network of
A later court, however, might well look upon the matter of responsibility a bit differently: it
might focus on the special competitive benefits accruing to a bank that can deliver services to
its customers through a terminal, notwithstanding the fact that someone else owns or con-

trols it. As Judge Wilkey pointed out, the basic question is one of federalism. 534 F.2d at
932-38. If banks use Judge Wilkey's own-or-rent test to carve a loophole in the dual-bank-

ing system, later courts may close the loophole by giving a broader meaning to the concept
of "establishing" or "supplying" a bankcard facility.
60. Actually, arrangements of this kind have occurred already. At least one bank issues

cards to customers of other banks, and allows the customers to withdraw cash from its
ATMs. It recovers the funds by presenting debits to the banks through the ACH. The
customers, on their part, preauthorize their own banks to honor the debits, but there are no
special agreements between the card-issuing bank and the banks where the customers hold
their deposits.
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brick-and-mortar branches, the extra anticompetitive effect of applying the
same standards to EFT terminals must be close to zero.
Achieving scale economies and promoting competition among banks are
not, however, the only goals of antitrust policy in this area. The basic
object of the antitrust laws is to see that the nation's resources are used as
efficiently as possible. 6 ' Accordingly, it is important to consider the extra
costs that users of bankcard services, both consumers and merchants, incur
as a result of any deployment restrictions on EFT terminals. These costs
do not always show up directly in the price or quality of service. They can
take more subtle forms, such as added inconvenience, or restricted choices,
or altered patterns of behavior.
So long as the "owned or leased" test prevails, these extra-bank effects
are likely to be small because the test is so easy to conform to. But if the
courts take a broader view of the McFadden Act - for example, if they
emphasize the competitive presence that a bank can achieve in a market by
means of an EFT terminal - the deployment restrictions could make
quite a difference to consumers and merchants. In that event, a consumer
would not be able to use a bankcard at an EFT terminal if his bank would
be ineligible to deploy its own terminal at that location: the use of the
bankcard would qualify as either "paying a check" written by him or
"'making a loan" to him.62 Instead, he would have to use some other
method of payment - a check, a credit card with paper documentation, or
cash - that he might have preferred not to use. The merchant would
suffer the extra costs of slower checkout procedures. The costs of having
EFT terminals in his store - lost shelf space, employee training expenses,
monthly service charges, and so on - would seem proportionately greater
if his customers were to use the terminals less often.
Of all payment vehicles, only bankcard services would have to endure
these demand-side costs. There are no equivalent restrictions on the use of
cash, checks, or ordinary credit cards. Accordingly, the overall effect of
the terminal restrictions would be to tilt the balance away from bankcard
services toward other payment vehicles - a tilt away from the most efficient mix of services, and a tilt away from the services that give the greatest
promise of long-term savings for the nation.
Whatever the fate of the "owned or leased" test, there will always remain the costs and delays of following regulatory procedures,63 plus the
61.

See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).

62. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d at 945, 948.
63. Federal banking regulators have taken steps to minimize these costs and delays.
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 303.14(l).
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costs of maintaining a bureaucracy to enforce them. Costs of this kind
should not be taken lightly. The Community Reinvestment Act, 64 for example, can provide a major obstacle to terminal deployment. The Act requires that, whenever a bank applies for permission to establish a "branch
or other facility with the ability to accept deposits, "65 the bank's federal
supervisor must assess its record in meeting the credit needs of its community, and particularly of low-income people who live there.66 Accordingly,
bankcard terminals can be held hostage to other federal objectives, such as
seeing that banks make enough mortgage loans to people in their communities. This kind of pressure may help carry out the purpose of the Community Reinvestment Act, but it does not do much for consumers of
bankcard services: they must bear the extra costs of compliance, and they
must do without the services when banks are found wanting.
In view of the residual arguments in favor of deregulating bankcard terminals, the question becomes whether there are any other public goals to
be served by retaining the terminal restrictions. For full-scale branches, of
course, there are several policy reasons for retaining control over the location of bank facilities. For example, one purpose behind the branching
laws is to preserve a vital dual banking system in which state governments
enjoy a significant degree of control over local banking conditions. Another is to ensure that banks remain sound, stable, and responsive to community needs.
These policies, however, do not provide any compelling reason to impose a separate set of geographic restraints on bankcard terminals. If
bankcard terminals by themselves do not disturb banking unduly, it seems
unlikely that states would lose their power to control those markets, even
though out-of-state institutions are able to use the terminals and accept
deposits through them. Nor is a state likely to lose the power to supervise
the institutions that it charters merely because those institutions serve some
out-of-state customers by means of EFT terminals. Finally, even the goal
of maintaining a stable and responsive banking industry does not require
control over the location of bankcard terminals, but only control over the
level of investment that a bank commits to this kind of service.
It must be conceded, however, that the residual arguments for deregulating EFT terminals do not have the same urgency as the competitive arguments once had. The best course might well be to end all federal controls
on bankcard terminals and to allow market forces to prevail. On the other
64. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. II 1978).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 2902 (Supp. 11 1978).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (Supp. 11 1978).
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hand, the rules do not appear to exert a very powerful effect on resource
allocations or to impose extraordinary costs on the nation. It might be
equally wise to leave things as they are and allow bankcard services to
develop without severe legal shocks and uncertainties. The worst course of
all would be to tinker constantly with the rules in the hope of striking some
ideal balance among competing objectives.
VI.

COMPULSORY-SHARING LAWS

Many states have adopted special rules to govern the sharing of bankcard systems. These laws generally provide that, when institutions operate
facilities in support of their own bankcard services, they must agree to
make the facilities available to other institutions on fair and nondiscriminatory terms. But the rules differ widely from state to state. For example,
some limit the sharing requirement to institutions of the same kind.67
Other states impose the sharing requirement only on terminals more than
a certain distance from the institution that deploys them.68 Still others require sharing of some kinds of facilities (such as point-of-sale terminals)
but not of others (such as ATMs).6 9
Supporters of these state statutes see them as a simple yet effective way
to prevent large banks from swamping smaller ones. They believe that the
laws will make it easier for the smaller banks to gain entry into the bankcard field and help make the market for bankcard services more competitive. At the same time, they also expect that the laws will help to maintain
the safety-and-soundness of smaller banks in a world where bankcard
services are an important competitive weapon. The laws, as seen by their
supporters, prevent large banks from using their dominance over one set of
banking services (demand and savings accounts) to extend their power into
a separate but related area (bankcard services).
Many observers object to the principle of compulsory sharing, however,
and believe Congress should nullify the state laws and preempt the field.7"
They argue that the sheer multiplicity of laws prevents bankcard services
from developing properly throughout a region. In addition, they contend
67.

See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 527.5 (Supp. 1979) (West) (requiring commercial

banks to share satellite terminals with other commercial banks; savings and loan associations to share with other savings and loan associations; and credit unions to share with other
credit unions).
68. See, e.g., N.C. AD. CODE ch. 3C, § 1500 (1979) (no state bank may deploy an ATM
more than 50 miles from its home office or nearest branch without making the ATM available to local institutions).
69. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-16-5, -6 (1979).

70. The NCEFT adopted this position. NCEFT FINAL REPORT at 97-98.
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that the laws deter innovation and entrench dominant banks. Small but
innovative institutions are stifled because, whenever they want to introduce a new idea, they have to make it available to all their rivals. These
critics also say that the sharing laws build in a legal bias toward large
general-purpose systems and against small and more specialized ones. Finally, the critics charge that compulsory-sharing laws may appear simple
in concept, but are extremely difficult and expensive to administer. Banks
will inevitably disagree on the terms and conditions of admission to an
operating bankcard system: the state banking agencies (or the courts) will
be clogged with disputes.
It is apparent that the debate on the issue of compulsory sharing has a
great deal in common with the debate on market-wide bankcard systems.
The two debates are rooted in the same soil: namely, the idea that banks
alone are involved in the production of bankcard services. Just as in the
case of the debate on market-wide systems, however, changing technology
is eroding the ground of the discussion. On one side, small banks do not
need the protection of compulsory-sharing laws when they can be sure of
gaining access to powerful, well-established clearing networks that serve
many banks. On the other side, there is no longer much reason to fear that
the compulsory-sharing laws will deter innovation in clearing techniques
or in bank services. The clearing intermediaries are subject to strong competitive pressure in their own line of commerce: they must continue to
improve themselves.
There are other reasons for believing that the debate over compulsorysharing laws has lost much of its urgency. For one thing, it seems likely
that federal antitrust laws override the state sharing requirements in cases
where they come in conflict. That is to say, although banks might have to
make their facilities available to newcomers, the newcomers may be barred
from taking advantage of the offer if the resulting arrangement would violate the antitrust laws.7 For another, it is not at all clear that federally
chartered institutions are bound by the compulsory-sharing requirement.
Neither federal credit unions nor federal savings and loan associations are
subject to any state controls over the location of bankcard terminals or
over the nature of the services that can be offered through them. Nor has
71. Because the newcomer has the option to join an established system or to form one of
its own, the necessary element of "active state supervision" is missing. See California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 4238 (March 3, 1980); see also

Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Moreover, states cannot authorize private parties to engage in conduct that would violate the antitrust laws unless Congress has
explicitly conferred that power on the states. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
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any court suggested that the principle of "competitive equality ' 72 applies
to the relation between federal and state thrifts. Even in the case of commercial banks, the principle of "competitive equality" seems limited to
parity in the matter of location and capitalization of bank facilities. 3 The
McFadden Act has never been interpreted to mean that states can compel
national banks to share branch offices with their rivals.
All in all, the national interest in preemption now appears much less
powerful than it might once have seemed. If anything, the federal interest
has shifted around to the other side of the question. To the extent that
compulsory-sharing laws merely express state policy regarding the operations of state-chartered institutions, the laws represent the exercise of state
authority under the dual banking compromise. The federal interest lies
with safeguarding the states' sphere of influence, at least on this score, because doing so helps promote the federal policies of community responsiveness, states' rights, and local control over the financial sector.
At the same time, however, states may be starting to have second
thoughts about compulsory-sharing laws. Although federally chartered institutions may not have to comply with state laws themselves, they may
nevertheless be able to use the laws against their state-chartered rivals. A
group of federal savings and loan associations, for example, may be able to
deploy their own terminals and provide their own clearing services for an
EFT system, and still be able to exclude state institutions (subject to antitrust constraints, of course). Yet the members of the group may also be
able to demand access to any bankcard facilities that the state institutions
might deploy on their own.
In addition, state laws commonly focus on the duties of agent banks, not
card-issuing banks, an approach that can put a heavy burden on local
small-town banks. Nebraska, for example, explicitly requires established
agent banks to designate a clearing entity to which they will deliver transactions.74 Nebraska also puts agent banks under a duty to see that the
designated intermediary will deal with newcomers.7 5 It is easy enough for
agent banks to comply with this rule when they control the intermediary.
It is much more difficult for them to do so when the intermediary is an
independent company. The intermediary may have its own reasons (perhaps antitrust reasons) for refusing to interconnect with a large card-issu72. See First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969); see also Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
73. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1976).
74. NEB. REV. STAT. 8-157(3) (1977).

75. Id
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ing bank that wants to enter the market, particularly if the bank has its
own EFT system elsewhere.
Furthermore, many state laws are much less detailed than those of Nebraska. In many cases it is not clear where the agent banks' obligations and their control over the arrangements - ends. On one hand, if the
agent banks have no duty to see that an intermediary stands ready to deal
with newcomers, the laws would mean very little. On the other hand, if
the laws are read to mean that a new card issuer could designate his own
intermediary, and compel small agent banks to work out arrangements
with it, the laws could impose significant costs on the small agent banks.
More to the point, compulsory sharing was intended to protect the smaller
banks, not force them into this kind of position.
For all these reasons, it seems likely that the compulsory-sharing laws
will wither on the vine over the next several years. There appears to be
little reason to insist on nullifying them and committing the area to federal
control. So long as the sharing requirement does not interfere with federal
interests, there does not seem to be any immediate need for the federal
government to preempt the state laws.
VII.

SOME NEW ISSUES IN BANKCARD SERVICES

As the earlier issues fade, new ones arise to take their place. Some are
traditional antitrust questions that have a special twist to them because
they arise in the context of the bankcard industry. It is possible, for example, to look upon a direct arrangement between a bankcard organization
and a retailer as being a misuse of pooled power on the part of the banks
that make up the organization.7 6
Other issues involve competitive questions that seem new only because
they arise outside the field of bank supervision. For example, the Post
Office has expressed an interest in offering electronic mail services."

The

debate on this matter has much in common with the debate on Federal
76. National Bankcard Corp. has recently brought suit against VISA, Inc., challenging
an arrangement between VISA and a major retailer under which the retailer would be eligible to issue VISA cards of its own. National Bankcard Corp. v. VISA, Inc., Civil No. 796355 (S.D. Fla., filed June 21, 1979). At one time the Department of Justice also considered

challenging Interbank's interchange fees as being a form of price fixing. But see Fisher v.
First Nat'l Bank, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977) (where the Eighth Circuit, relying on its own

decision in Worthen Bank & Trust Co., rejected a claim that the members of a bankcard
system were engaging in price fixing).
77. The United States Postal Rate Commission has recently issued an opinion regarding a proposal of this kind made by the United States Postal Service. See Opinion & Recommended Decision Upon Reconsideration, Electronic Mail Classification Proposal (1978),
U.S. Postal Rate Comm'n, Docket No. MC 78-3 (April 8, 1980).
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Reserve ACHs. But where it might be reasonable for the Federal Reserve
to operate ACHs, and even to clear bankcard items through them, it would
be a mistake to give the Post Office a free hand in the broader field of
electronic communications. The Post Office could exert a chilling effect on
the development of new data transmission techniques and services; the
bankcard industry (along with many others) would suffer the consequences.
The Bell System has also expressed an interest in offering new kinds of
telecommunications services, particularly services that entail a heavy use
of data processing techniques. At the moment, the Bell System is prevented from moving very far in this direction by the terms of its 1956 Consent Decree agreement with the Department of Justice,7 8 The Bell System
would like to relax the Decree in order to gain more flexibility in providing
advanced kinds of telecommunications services. The banking industry
ought to be wary of this initiative. The Bell System's services could overlap with, and compete against, the more specialized EFT services offered
by banks. Moreover, the Bell System's overwhelming competitive power
would give it a strong advantage.7 9
The most important issues, however, may be those that proceed from the
growing coalescence between "banking" services - particularly payment
services - and other data processing and telecommunications functions.
The advent of EFT technology has made the payments mechanism vastly
more flexible and efficient. Banks no longer have to deal with an irreducible paper document containing all the information that any bank might
need, nor must they wait their turn to process it. Instead, the document
can be replaced by a series of direct messages, each containing just the
information that any bank might need in order to carry out its own part in
the transaction.
This change does more than merely streamline the payments mechanism. It also makes it possible to integrate payments information with the
wealth of nonfinancial data that businesses exchange with one another in
the course of a transaction, but which have historically moved through
other channels: data such as shipping instructions, invoices, government
documentation, and so on. Gathering these streams together in a broad78. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 68,246 (D.C.N.J., filed Jan.
24, 1956).
79. The Federal Communications Commission has recently been considering the issues
raised by the changes in the communications and data processing industries and the
problems associated with the tendency of the two industries to merge into each other. See
FCC Deregulates Enhanced Telecommunications Services & Terminal Equipment, F.C.C.
Docket No. 20828, Pub. Notice Mimeo No. 30294 (released April 7, 1980).
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ranging communications network could make the entire flow of commercial information more efficient. It could also lead to entirely new kinds of
services and arrangements. For example, a shipper might be able to exercise much greater control over the movement of goods without diminishing
the security or disturbing the interests of intermediate parties. In the bankcard field, banks might be able to offer new kinds of cash-management and
household inventory-control services to consumers.
Unless banks obtain wider powers, however, they may not be able to
produce services of this kind themselves. Such services may not qualify as
"incidental" 8 to banking, or even as "closely related"'" to banking, at
least in any traditional sense.82 They are at best "functionally related," to
borrow a term once suggested by the Federal Reserve;83 that is, they complement traditional banking services and make use of many data in common with them. Banks may be able to overcome this kind of problem by
forming very close working relationships with nonfinancial companies. In
that event, however, the banks run the risk of being reduced to mere passive providers of financial information to the nonbanking entities; furthermore, some services that have traditionally been regarded as part of the
business of banking (such as correspondent services) may migrate to the
nonfinancial sector.
Some might suggest that this trend would be in the public interest. After
all, Congress has long asserted the value of keeping the overall economic
power of banks within bounds, and to that end has restricted the list of
services that banks are eligible to perform. Furthermore, if banks are allowed to offer new kinds of service, banking supervisors would have to
assume new responsibilities and exercise more control over activities that
would otherwise be safe from regulation. In short, other things being
equal, an argument might be made that it is better to keep banks out of
any new fields, so long as nonbanking companies stand ready to provide
equivalent services on a competitive basis - so goes the line of argument.
80. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976); see National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975); cf. 12 C.F.R. § 225.123 (1980).
82. See National Retailers Corp. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979); cf.
Association of Data Processing Svc. Org., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., Civ. No. 77-2574
(S.D.N.Y., complaint filed May 24, 1977) (opposing Citibank's offering of computer services
to the public); f Application of Citicorp to Engage in Worldwide Time-Sharing and Computer Services Through "Citishare" Corporation, 44 Fed. Reg. 50,405 (1979) (examining
Citicorp's proposal to offer computer services through a new subsidiary).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 91-387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1969); See also S. REP. No.
91-1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5519-
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But other things are not equal. It may be true that in many ways the
new electronic services go beyond the traditional scope of banking activities. Nevertheless, the new services may be intimately involved with the
depository and payment functions. These functions lie at the heart of
banking and provide the basic reason for exercising oversight of the banking industry. Furthermore, unless banks are able to participate fully in
producing the new services, some kinds of services might never come into
existence, while others might have to absorb extra costs in order to accommodate themselves to outdated regulatory requirements. Some broadening of bank powers - and some broadening of bank supervisors' powers
- may therefore be appropriate. In particular, banks would need wider
data communications and data processing authority.
One of the consequences of giving banks wider powers, however, is that
a new contingent of companies would become eligible to enter the business
of banking. Their entry could present new questions about the proper degree of economic power that the financial industry ought to be able to
exercise. In addition, banks themselves might have their own reasons to be
worried. Some data processing and telecommunications companies might
want to acquire banks in order to supplement their existing line of services.
Banking/telecommunications conglomerates would represent a marked
change in the character of the banking industry and could present a strong
competitive challenge to banks without that dimension.
Another possibility is that the character of bank supervision could
change. One of the most intractable problems may be judging the safetyand-soundness of bank services that by their very nature depend on coordinated activity by many parties, some of whom are not subject to federal
supervision. Perhaps bank regulators will have to put more emphasis on
safeguards that come into play after damage has been inflicted, rather than
on procedures aimed at preventing the damage from occurring. This kind
of approach might preserve the flexibility of banking services. But, at the
same time, it could entail a higher degree of risk for the consumer and for
the banking system as a whole.
It may also become more difficult to judge what kinds of data processing
and telecommunications services are permitted for banks. Bank supervisors may have to move away from a "laundry-list" approach, in which
certain services are generally approved for all banks, and adopt a more
particularized approach that pays special attention to the circumstances of
the applicant. Put another way, bank supervisors may have to move away
from across-the-board rulemaking, and lean more toward adjudicatory
procedures, or procedures that have more of the flavor of the Department
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of Justice's Business Review Letter mechanism. This kind of shift could be
costly for the agencies and could lead to greater controversy over particular decisions. But it may be the only way to deal with the extremely complicated questions that are likely to arise as the banking and
telecommunications industries begin to intersect.
A third consequence is that standard-setting is likely to become more
significant as a competitive factor than it has been in the past. So long as
standards (such as MICR encoding for checks) have only applied to exchanges among banks, it has been comparatively easy to keep them from
favoring one group of competitors over another. Today, however, standards affect many parties besides banks and can intrude into the relationship between banks and their customers. If standards have the effect of
choking off alternative bankcard technologies, of shutting out competitors,
or of artificially raising the prices for bankcard services, the standards
might be vulnerable to attack as being a misuse of the banks' pooled
power.
Standard-setting also raises consumer protection issues. Banks have
tried to protect their cardholders by issuing personal identification numbers to them, and by using the numbers to verify the identities of people
seeking to use their cards. As electronic consumer services grow more
complex, there may soon be a need for new kinds of protective mechanisms. Banks will want to make sure that these mechanisms can be
adapted to the operational requirements of multibank networks. Consumer advocates may recognize the banks' needs, but they will want to
make sure that the mechanisms are easy for people to understand, and that
the standards do not jeopardize the cardholders' privacy. The debate on
this issue has hardly begun.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

For several years, antitrust concerns in the bankcard industry have focused on two main points: defeating rules that limit the scope and variety
of bankcard systems, and preventing monopolistic bankcard systems
(whether government-operated or privately-owned) from coming into being. The bankcard industry has changed so much, however, that these
matters may no longer deserve a very high priority. Instead, the telecommunications and data processing aspects of bankcard services - and of
banking in general - may form the center of the next round of debate.
It is still too early to tell what sort of competitive problems are likely to
present the most trouble once banking emerges from this period of transition. Moreover, it is too early to judge what sort of constraints may be
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needed to deal with these problems. The only thing that seems clear is that
the issues that once dominated the debate have lost their focus: changing
technology has made them obsolete.

